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This paper is a discussion of corruption and bribery from the angles of
ethics and psychology, of psychoanalysis, sociology and "kindynology".1
It is offered as a possible introduction to a future jurisprudence of
corruption. The revelations of the Kefauver Committee make it a crime
against our generation to neglect thinking very seriously of the subject
matter of this discussion.
Lawyers have not overlooked the social dangers caused by cor-
ruption and bribery. On the contrary, they may have been impressed
with extra-legal viewpoints to the detriment of clear legal thought.
Lawyers often assume that in the extra-legal fields more progress
as to guiding ideas and systematization has already been achieved, than
in their own field. In fact, much of our extra-legal knowledge of the
ethics, etc. of bribery is still in the state of common sense-philosophy,
which is a hybrid-neither common sense nor philosophy-and which
compares neither with the direct life-experience of the plain man nor the
systematic thought of the true philosopher and scientist.
In this paper I have attempted to present the extra-legal viewpoints
as systematically as possible. This is done in the hope that the legal
1. "Kindynology" is a new word taken from the Greek (for danger). The lore of the en-
dangerments has not yet been written. In fact, being in danger and in mental anguish
threatens the entire dynamic energy of the individual or the group who feels so endangered,
and lowers, in most cases, the level of aspiration. If and when such mental anguish is
brought on a person by the carelessness, the neglect or the willful action of another this
other person should be made liable for tort. "Whenever we speak of endangerment we mean
that a person or a group wrongfully creates, or allows to persist, situations which, with
reasonable probability, will expose other persons to risks in such a way that the person who
has touched off the situation will no longer be able to influence it nor, by his action, avert
the final effect." (H. Zangger)
The Swiss Heinrich Zangger, Director of the Zuerich Institute of Legal Medicine, Zuerich,
Switzerland, has devoted more than 200 pages of his book "MEDIZIN UND RECHT, (Verl.
A4rt Institut Orell Fuessli, Zuerich, 1920) to the cooperation of medicine and law in the
problems of danger and endangerment. Zangger's above definition could be shortened thus:
Endangerment is a condition which is avoidable on the strength of human volition and
action. The condition is characterized by a higher than average probability of damage.
We want to point out in this introductory remark that bribery and corruption are typical
endangerments of security, public welfare, socio-economic life and political life with all their
consequences for the lowering of standards in all the above mentioned fields. Therefore the
importance of a systematic "kindynology" or "kindynics."
317
WVLAIDIMIR ELIASBERG
treatment of our problem in the penal law and elsewhere will be
benefited in various ways by a clarification of facts and concepts, and
that this, in turn may lead to economy in law and enforcement. This
last result should be desired by lawyers no less than by the people
at large.
In no way should the present paper be construed as a subtle attempt
by a non-jurist to trespass upon the legal field. What we have attempted
rather is to prepare everything for the title-holder-the lawyer-to
occupy and to cultivate, for the common weal, what by right is his
patrimony.
I. HISTORICAL, ETHICO-POLITICAL, MOTIVATIONAL,
SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
One should speak of corruption only, when officials or persons of
semi-official standing, or licensees who are deemed bound by ethical
standards, accept something of negotiable value for which, on the
surface, they do not pay. Corruption can be defined only by enumerat-
ing one or more legal concepts and comparing them historically, and
in the light of international law. A survey of older and more modern
American concepts yields the following: the makers of the Constitution
were led by group-interests and partly, also, by self-interest. If the
self-interest became too strong, it was considered improper, although
not amenable to impeachment. Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury,
showed "hesitancy in passing upon his own land claims but did not
deem it incompatible with his official duties to communicate occasionally
with friends, as to the probable prices of public securities and bank
stocks . . . neither did he deem it necessary to inhibit his brother-in-law
from dealing in securities". 2
The American system of spoils and patronage since Andrew Jackson
has time and again been considered proper because it enables the
party in power to govern with the aid of officials who will be loyal.
It has not been considered improper for a representative to put his
wife or some other relative on the congressional payroll; it is not im-
proper even if said employe does not work very seriously. But it is
improper, for the employer to accept a kickback. Corruption is legally
defined as: the "act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully
and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit
for himself or for another".3 The emphasis is on. unlawfully and
2. CHARLES A. BEARD: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES; The Macmillan Co., 194-1, N. Y.
3. H. C. BLACK: A LAW DICTIONARY: 2nd Edition, West Publishing Co., 1910, p. 227.
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wrongfully. Just what is in a given time, and place, considered unlaw-
ful or wrongful is not a matter of a priori ethics of conduct. It is the
purpose, then, to find out the psychological, social-psychological and
sociological bases on which ethical and legal concepts of corruption
and bribery have been built, and to find out furthermore how in a
changing world corruption and bribery in turn have kept changing.
The latter will not, however, be taken up in this paper.
There are cases of red blooded corruption where the negotiable
value does not appear on the surface, and on the other hand nego-
tiable values, handy cash, which do not in themselves constitute full
fledged bribery. Examples of the first constellation will be given later.
The following case belongs to the second group: If a grateful patient
gives a gift to his physician besides the usual fee, no one speaks of
corruption. Albeit gifts have, as we will point out later, very par-
ticular psychological effects, the patient who makes a gift is not trying
to secure something which other patients would not be able to secure
without additional offers.
Free-of-charge offers have been discussed by economists, psychologists
and advertisers. There are two types of such offers: those where, in-
deed, nothing is charged nor is any reciprocation expected, as e.g. in
charity.4 There are secondly such apparently free offers which do not
show in the bill but which raise the general level of the charges: thus, a
hotel will not charge for the elevator but it has a higher basic level of
charges than a walk-up hotel.
Acceptance of free gifts, if it is called corruption, is economically
within the pale of the second type.5 If a bribe is given and accepted both
parties are either explicitly or tacitly agreed upon this much: the appar-
ent gift should be requited in some way. Furthermore, as we said above,
the one who may be bribed is a public personality, especially an official.6
4-. While the medieval donor expected redemption in exchange for his donations, the
modern benefactor grand style, wants survival in the Hall of Fame or restitution of his good
name. But such returns come only pro rata from the individual beneficiaries and it is not
necessarily corruption if the public benefactor benefits privately, although the case approaches
somehow Mandeville's notorious statement: "Private Vices, Public Benefits." At any rate It
is only the relationship between the individual recipient (or his group) and the individual
donor (and his group) that may deteriorate into corruption; example of the latter: so-called
government slush funds.
5. KARL MARBE: PSYCHOLOGIE DER WERTREKLAME, Stuttgart, 1930; W. ELIASBERG: REK-
LAMEWISSENSCHAFTEN; Verl. Rudolph M. Rohrer, Bruenn, Prag, Leipzig, Wien, 1936. SAME:
ARZT UND PROPAGANDA; Saturn Verl. Wien, 1936.
6. HAROLD D. LASSWELL: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. 1, p. 690. Macm. 1932,
N. Y. finds that to bribe is to control by means of tangible inducement rather than by per-
suasion or coercion. In this definition the means are stressed and the motivation is omitted.
In that same article Lasswell mentions that an offer of money may shade over to such less
tangible forms of influences as calculated sociability. Even with this addition the definition
is insufficient. Bribe implies that a choice remains for the recipient as well as for the donor.
Otherwise we should have to speak of extortion or imposition. But where there is a choice
there is motivation (see later in the text) for such choice.
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Historically this has not always been the case and a short survey of
the historical changes in the concept of the obligations and duties of
officials is worth while. The Greeks7 and the Romans held that knowl-
edge and science, ideas and philosophical insights, education, the per-
formance of religious rituals and government in its judicial, legislative
and executive branches should be above the level of money, fee, etc.
Epistemology, the theory or science of the method and grounds of
knowledge, was deemed invaluable. This, of course, was connected in
antiquity with the underestimation of paid work. The changes in the
meaning of the Greek word Banausos, (originally a stoker, later a
craftsman and finally anyone hiring himself out for paid work), give
away the story. Aristotle in his Politics divides the workers into two
groups; slaves who serve one master and banausi who have to obey
anybody. The same way Cicero says: Nec vero quidquam ingenuum
potest habere officina.8 It is worth mentioning that in the Middle Ages
the crime of simony was just the selling of spiritual, immaterial, religi-
ous, clerical goods for mundane profits. "You must not desire to buy
the gift of the holy ghost."
In his "Philosophical Disquisition on Money," George Simmel9 has
shown that money creates merely functional relations between people.
Sociological and psychoanalytical' 0 investigations of capitalism concur
in this one finding: Leading types of financiers are extremely retiring
and impersonal in their human relationships; in other words the func-
tional character of money and the functional character of the financier"
meet halfway. We will see later that this functional character of money
plays a particular role in bribery.
7. Cf. the excellent and profound study by THEODOR LOEWENFELD Infistimabilitjit and
Honorierung der Artes Liberales nach Roemischem Recht. Aus der Festgabe der Miinchner
Juristenfacultaet zum Doctorjubilaeum des Herrn Geheimen Rats und Professors Dr. Joh.
Jul. Wilh. von Planck, Muenchen, Christian Kaiser, 1887.
W. ELIASBERG: ZuR KULTURGESCHICHTE DER PSYCHOTECHNIK KWARTALNIK PSYCHOLOGISZNY,
Poznan, 1936.
W. ELIASBERG: PSYCHOLOGIE DER HOEHEREN GEITIGEN BERUFE NEDERLANDSCH TIJDSCHRITT
VOOR PSYCHOLOGIE, 1938.
A. AYMARD: L'IDFE DE TRAVAIL DANS LA GRECE ARCHAIQUE. JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NOR-
MALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE, No. 1 1948.
8. CICERO: DE OFFIcaS, I, 42.
9. GEORGE SIMMEL: DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES GELDES; Munich and Leipzig, Duncker &
Humblot, 1920.
10. Q. PFISTER: DER SEELISCHE AUFBAU DES KLASSISCHEN KAPITALISMUS UND DER GELD-
GEISTES. Schriften zur Seelenkunde und Erziehungskunst, H. VII, Verl Ernst Brichner Bern,
1923. The much broader investigations by MAX WEBER: GESAMMELTE AUFSAETZE ZUR RELI-
GIONSSOZIOLOGIE, I. TUEBINGEN 1920. Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapita-
lismus. ERNST TROELTScH: DIE SOZIALLEHREN DER CHRISTLICHEN KIRCHEN which appeared
in Germany in 1912, translated by Olive Wion, New York, 1931. THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES. (Macmillan).
11. LINCOLN STEFFENS: CHARACTER PICTURE OF WEYERHAEUSER in his Autobiography,
Harcourt Brace, N. Y. 1931.
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As for those whose activities are carried on within the frame of
modern civilized national life, and for the officials, too, continued atti-
tudes and obligations are required.
This holds true also for the professions. Should the individual pro-
fessional man not find it in his conscience, to observe an established,
often antiquated rule, it is enforced by the professional association to
which he belongs. The enforcement in business may be more along the
lines of mores, folkways, rituals and taboos and is on the whole effective
enough. For the official there are solemn ceremonies such as taking the
oath, hierarchical supervision, promotion and demotion, and specific
rules in the particular branches of the services. There are, moreover,
strictly regulated ways of accesion, tenure, discharge, rights to pension,
etc. At present, the general obligation of the official consists of. an
orderly and impartial discharge of his particular duties in such a way
that the general welfare is promoted.12
Why are such general obligations of the officials and semi-officials
vitiated by the acceptance of benefits? Such benefits are offered by a
person who in some particular case wants definite action possibly to the
detriment of someone else or" to the detriment of public welfare. At
any rate such action is supposed to be wrongful in various senses; a.)
such offers and acceptances are prohibited by positive laws. b.) there is
danger that such action will be harmful to private and public interests.
c.) the equality before the law and due process of administration are
harmed by such actions.' 4
The assumption of a definite point-to-point-relationship between the
act of bribery and the action to be expected is incorrect in various re-
spects. From the legal, the social-psychological and the motivational
points of view it is important to note that a reciprocity, a Do-Ut-Des,
a value-for-value-relationship is rather the exception than the rule.
But we have first to consider the general political and sociological
background of corruption. Corruption on a large scale is observed on
the political scene, if and when the political power is no longer vested
in that class which still has economic power. Such separation of powers
12. In times gone by only the welfare of the prince mattered.
13. The one damaged may be a competitor or an employe or an authority, such as the
Federal Government. Cf. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND: WHITE COLLAR CRIME, Dryden Press,
N. Y. 1949, PP. 180, 217, 233.
14. The voluminous British literature on Secret Commissions, etc., edited by the Secret
Commissions and Bribery Prevention League. The British law dates back tk 1906, ALBERT
CREW: THE LAW RELATING TO SECRET COMMISSIONS AND BRIBES, CHRISTMAS BOXES, GRATUITIES,
Tips, etc. The Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906, Putnam & Sons, London, 1913. The
German literature has dealt with the criminal aspects of bribing and officials: MAX HEiSE:
BESTECHUNG UND BESTECHLICHKEIT, H. Adler, Greifswald, 1909 (Corruption and Corrupti-
bility). There has also been a voluminous German literature on the problem of acceptance
of benefits by employees. (UNLAUTERER WETrEEWaRB-unfair business practices).
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becomes the more accentuated, irrespective of the form of government,
the more the polity is democratized. In the democratic polity political
encroachment on economic power continues to increase. Therefore, the
increasing tendency on the part of business to neutralize political with
economic power. Thus corruption of individual officials is followed by
the corruption of governing bodies. Rebecca West in her very clear
report on the recent investigation of corruption within the labor govern-
ment,15 has shown how in the back of the mind of many of the leading
officials and politicians there is the idea of securing some position with
industry once the political "plums" will have withered away. Social-
psychologically there is no great difference between corruption of poli-
ticians and officials, especially not in the parliamentary system as in
England where members of parliament or otherwise deserving members
of the party get leading positions in the executive branch. Public opinion
holds that it is the duty of both the public officials and the politicians to
discharge their obligations honestly. Said Lord Russel' 6 in introducing
the Prevention of Corruption Act: The evil of the commissions blunts
tfie sense of honor and honesty.17
There is one more reason why in a democracy corruption is more dis-
ruptive and this has come to the fore in France at the time of the
Stavisky scandals in February 1934, in the Barmat and Sklarek scandals
in Germany in the '20s, as well as in the Sidney Stanley-John Belcher
scandal in England, 1948-49. In modern marketing branded merchan-
dise represents good will and belief when knowledge is not available to
the consumer. We have known a time in the beginning of the modern
age when knowledge did supersede belief. We should face the fact that
in modern democracy, owing to its bigness, belief has to supersede
knowledge I
BELIEF IN WHAT? BELIEF IN MOTIVATIONS
Motivations are for practical purposes:' very similar to attitudes.
Gordon W. Allport writes: "An Attitude is a mental and neural state
15. REBECCA WEST: The Tribunal that Stirred England; HARPER'S MAGAZINE, June,
July, 1949. (The parallel among the English, French and German scandals is pointed out
in the text).
16. LORD RUSSEL: Quoted from R. L. LEONARD in WOMAN AND BRIBERY, London, The
Bribery Prevention League.
17. Pearl S. Buck, to the contrary, thinks that Americans should learn from the Chinese
that art of stripping life of a useless romanticism and should accept life as is and find it
worthwhile, grafters and all. P. BUCK: "The Chinese Attitude Toward Graft; Harpers
Mag. Jan. 1935 (The Chinese may not have known modern democracy, after alll)
18. W. ELIASBERG: The Closeup of Psycho-sexual Gratification. J. OF NERV. AND MENT.
DISEASE Vol. 99, No. 2, Feb. 1944.
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of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dy-
namic influence upon the individual's responses to all objects and situa-
tions with which he is related."1 9
The difference between this concept of attitude and my concept of
motivation 20 is the following: in motivation emphasis is put on con-
sciousness or potential consciousness instead of on the physiological and
neurological readiness. Motivations themselves or the patterns of action
derived from them will at some time in the individual development be-
come conscious. An adult person will know that in a certain situation
he is expected or expects himself to act in a certain way. Motivations
resemble neither the personality nor the situation, neither the drive nor
the law, neither the emotions nor the observances, neither the volition
nor the social compulsion. The motivation is rather the diffusion mem-
brane between the personality system and the situation system. 21
Motivations are built up in the various phases of the individual's
life from boyhood to adolescence, to adulthood and to old age. This
is a slow process and by analogy to a well known biological law, accord-
ing to which late achievements crumble first, motivations are highly vul-
nerable. They are, as has been wittily remarked, soluble in alcohol but
while, after such a disappearance owing to a spree, most of the motiva-
tions usually will reappear, they will not do so if exposed to the acid
test of bribery. On the contrary, lasting deviations from the path of
honor may be the result of even the puniest bribe.
In addition to the sociological considerations there are also psycho-
logical reasons for the far reaching effect of corruption. Why is the
man who has once been caught in a lie no longer trusted? Not because
his next statement is met with an associative recollection of his lie, but
because we all assume that the purposive actions of human beings in
civilization are motivated by lasting motivations. Thus we feel that the
acceptance of unlawful benefits in a single case was possible only because
there was already a vitiated attitude.
19. GORDON W. ALLPORT in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, CARL MURCHISON, Editor,
Clark University Press, Worcester, Mass., 1935, Ch. 16.
20. W. [LIASBERG: and co-workers: BEITRAEGE ZUR ARErrsPATHOLOGIE, Berlin, Karger,
1931.
W. ELIASBERG: GRUNDRISS EINER ALLGEMEINEN ARBEITSPATHOLOGIE, Joh. A. Barth, Leip-
zig, 1924.
W. ELIASBERG: RECHTSPFLEGE UND PSYCHOLOGIE: Verl. Carl Heyman, Berlin, 1932.
21. For further detail see:
W. ELIASBERG: DAS ZWANGSERLEBNIS UND DER SOZIALE ZWANG ZTSCHR. F. D. GES NEUROLOGIE
UND PSYCHIATRIE Bd. 126, H. 4, 1930.
W. I. THOMAS AND F. ZNANIECKI: THE POLISH PEASANT IN EUROPE AND AMERICA; Analysis
by HERBERT BLUMER IN CRITIQUES OF RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: I, Bull. 44, 1939.




II. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL
ASPECTS
Psychology can teach us more. Meeting each other in a friendly way
is a strong force in social life. We react in a sympathetic way to the
one who meets us in a sympathetic manner. Thus any single action of
sympathy even a mere gesture may create obligation. And it should be
stressed that those rungs of kindliness from the fleeting "idealistic" ges-
ture to the lasting material object are, psychologically at any rate, steps
on one ladder. Thus, corruption very often does not start with that
purposeful sub-surface understanding which we mentioned above but
with an open handshake. And very often the noose is put around the
neck of the victim without his noticing that he is becoming ensnared.
As the poet says of the beginnings of love:
You meet by accident, you feel you stay
And by degrees your heart is tangled-
And there's a neat romance complete 'ere you know
What the giver experiences is quite similar. It is again Georg Simmel22
in his Sociology who has analyzed the meaning of the gift: such mean-
ing is first in the act of giving itself which is the expression of the love,
the sacrifice, the expansive mood of the one who gives (see above). But
on the other hand the meaning may be in what the gift achieves, i.e.
that the recipient should be possessed of certain material, thus uniting
the giver and the recipient in the act of giving as well as in the transfer
of the gift.
But here danger lurks. In the normal act of giving, the gift wears
out and loses its charm very soon, often too soon. Thus from the lover's
hands an endless chain of gifts and charms will flow. Des petits cadeaux
entretiennent l'amiti6. In the normal act of giving the giver and the re-
cipient are in a very specific relationship. The giver is, at least in this
particular act, the superior. Thus the child receives gifts from the grown
up and the beloved one from the lover. If this order is changed, if the
weaker gives to the stronger, something may be going wrong and sus-
picion is aroused. We will remember those gifts of vanity in ancient
imperial Rome (see footnotes 4 and 7). But things may be much more
wrong from the angle of social psychology. It has been said that the
Tzarist absolutism was mitigated by corruptibility and it is of course
the weakest minorities which are using this method of mitigating oppres-
sion. We may recall, also, our own "sub-surface new deal," so-called-
22. GXORG SIMMEL: SOZIOLOGIE, Duncker and Humblot, Berlin, 1908.
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that whole system of political corruption based on monies, stemming
from prostitution, illegal gambling, policy racket, etc.
What is the role of the minority in corruption? The complete simi-
larity of German, French, English and Tzarist Russian cases (see foot-
notes 14 and 15) allows us to derive some general laws. The oppressed
minority certainly does not of its own create oppression or the necessity
of mitigating oppression by bribes. That oppressive government is a
"pathological" abnormality is shown by, among other symptoms, a
diminished resistance to corruption and bribery. Once the basic con-
ditions of diminished resistance of the oppressor and increased distress
on the part of the oppressed exist, some specific psychological conditions
will guide the selection of those individuals that will come to the fore-
ground. We will refer later to the psychological rules.
Suspicions may also be vouchsafed where the donor and the re-
cipient are equals. Indeed very important "side effects" may be observed.
The gift does not wear out normally, it is not forgotton, it is repressed
in the psycho-analytical meaning of the word. One resists the recollec-
tion actively. Even more active is the type which is described in the
saw: "Ingratitude is the way of this world." Here the obligation is not
forgotten or repressed, it is resented; it is requited with hostility.
Goethe in "Truth and Fiction" differentiates the wearing out type,
the forgetful type of ungratefulness, from the resentment in superior
men who were forced to accept "charity." By being ungrateful they
want to regain their freedom of action.
Sum total: Sympathy and generosity will not always find sympathetic
responses. We do not want to be under obligation.
But the corrupting gift bars the way back to freedom. Kindliness and
sympathy have made us supine. From now on we can no longer forget
or ab-react or repress. We are in the noose. Gratefulness, as our exam-
ples have shown, can not be an eternal bond. Corruption wants to create
eternal bondage and it does so bind.
Thus the psychology of corruption makes it clear how necessary it is
to fight it. But the fight is not easy. So far the weapons have been
borrowed from the penal law and politics. But a definite success has
never been reached in this way. No fusion party, no good government
party has ever been able to live up to its promises. Nor have the cam-
paign promises of the clean government parties ever rung with truth.
Thus practical experiences show that it is necessary to turn to psychology
and sociology.
Social psychology of corruption yields an aspect which is somewhat
surprising to the man in the street. In big as well as in small corruption
1951]
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the one who is bribed rarely succumbs to mere greed. It is not the homo-
economicus who is endangered by corruption. He, after figuring what
profits his unlawful action could bring, will think of his risks and finally,
like a good business man, will feel that he must be indemnified for such
risks. This indeed is the way the one who corrupts usually proceeds.
Figuring his risks he would, as a good business man, retire from a
"corruption-transaction," if his gain would not be considerably higher
than what he could gain in the lawful way. But those who are corrupted
are no five-percenters, no ten-percenters, nor twenty-percenters. They
do not figure their risks, in fact they are very far from any sound
business calculation.
Rebecca West has pointed out, in her already quoted article, astound-
ing facts which are fully borne out by the above mentioned experiences
in the twenties in Germany. More or less well salaried officials were
caught with such pittances as three silken shirts, two bottles of whisky,
a weeks' stay in some resort, all expenses paid, a cocktail party, some
vague promise given by a shady character, some doubtful social contact
or a mirage of a wonderful job for the rainy day. But the realities, the
monies that change hands, are pittances. It is definitely psychology and
not economic thinking which explains such cheap selling out as that of
John Belcher, parliamentary secretary of the board of trade. Silken
shirts are a luxury. It is as though the rustling of the silk lures. Luxuries
flatter. And that one has the power to have luxuries without having to
pay for them, without that indignation which goes with any financial
obligation, without any "shelling out of dough" flatters and raises self-
assertion. This is the psychology of those well-to-do people who will
never go to a concert or to a theatre but on a courtesy ticket. They
would feel humiliated if they had to pay as Tom, Dick and Harry must.
They must go to the wicket "Reserved Seats" and must have it handed
to them. The cheapness of corruption does not make it the less danger-
ous. In fact honesty is much more destroyed in such cases of cheapness
than in cases where the one who took a bribe at least knew his price.
Who are the ones who can get their man so cheap? Rebecca West
has described that fish-eyed, funny little man with the auriole of reddish
hair, circling an otherwise bald pate, with his funny White-Chapel
dialect, his limitless ambitions, his technique of sneaking up to people,
of catching the mice with the cat and the cat with the mice-one of
those "Luft-Menschen" as they were called in the European East,
living in a milieu of guilded mirrors, in rooms, each one furnished
in the style of another Louis; men, in short, eagerly looking for the
[Vol. 42
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admission ticket, as Heine called it, and at the same time able to
understand only the weakest spots of that civilization to which they
seek admission. Most of these unassimilable people remain in their
ghetto, content to live out their lives with or without the help of
some sub-surface new deal. Some can't. But one should not be mis-
taken about the basic conditions of their existence. They are what
in immunology is called super-infectious germs, meaning that they can
thrive only if the tissue is already weakened by a primary infection.
The fact that they thrive shows that there had already been a diseased
condition. Usually, when they are exposed to trial, public opinion
wonders how such shady characters could get to the peak; how they
could make their contact with respectable people.
"Curtail'd of this fair proportion
"Cheated of feature by dissembling nature
"Deform'd, unfinish'd. ...
not only linguistically but otherwise, too. Their legal judges as well
as public opinion point their finger and feel "holier than thou". But
in fact such reactions are perfectly useless and even worse than that,
as far as prevention goes.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PREVENTION
AND IMPROVEMENT
Considering the present set-up in our democracy which is governed
by universal ballot and also by unequally distributed-financial powers,
what can be done about corruption? The first aim would be to attempt
to diminish the distance between economic and political power. This
is a political problem which we do not intend to tackle in our context.
In democracy there should be much more careful and scientifically
based selection of personnel than has been used so far. Vocational
guidance, experimental psychology, applied psychology, psychoanalysis,
sociometry, clinical interviews, questionnaires, graphological analysis,
psycho-pathology, projective tests should not supersede, but rather co-
operate with, the usual method of screening which we will call shortly,
and unprejudicially, the F.B.I. method. In applying these methods there
is, of course, no need to forego other checks such as congressional
hearings, etc. in appropriate cases.
Apart from the carelessness, in character-selection in democracies,
it is also a fact that those selected are not well versed in the techniques
of handling people so as to avoid snares, and that they are haunted
by the banshee of financial insecurity. This does not mean that cor-
19511
WLADIMIR ELIASBERG
ruption is unknown in 'aristocracy or in fascism or in monarchy. On
the contrary it is more rankling in those systems because it is hushed
up and because the aristocratic standard of life is higher. Corruption
is more expensive in the aristocratic system both to the one who bribes
and to the administration.
There is also the following difference between corruption in democ-
racy, on the one hand, and in monarchy (aristocracy), on the other.
Because there are more titles, medals, ribbons and honors available in
monarchy, the universal human need for recognition can on the whole
be better satisfied in a monarchy than in a democracy (Montesqieu).
And here we indeed may point out a way to partial prevention of
corruption. Satisfaction of the need for recognition belongs in the
broader field of sympathetic social contacts. And sympathetic contacts
are apt to diminish tensions, 28 "contractions," introversion, egotism,
etc., which are in an atmosphere of better human understanding replaced
by expansion, extraversion, altruism and the concommitant motivations.
It is easier, ceteris paribus, for a sympathetic, altruistic, expansive man
to stay honest than for an introvert egotist. Therefore, love, courtesy
in the vehicular and social traffic, taking it easy, the whole atmosphere
of increased sympathy is preventive of that disease of public life-
corruption. Corruption belongs in the line of social destruction which
threatens whenever the libido demands of human beings (not only
the common man as S. Freud thought) are not sufficiently satisfied. 4
Sympathetic contacts may be both tangible and abstract, the latter
being oriented on abstract orders, laws, statutes, rules, etc., a fact which
is usually taken to refer to the one kind of tangible rub-elbow contact.
But the abstract order, too, is amenable to sympathy.25
SUMMARY
Although the functional character of money brings corruption and
bribery to its peak, merely functional, economic definitions of corrup-
tion stressing the "means" are incomplete. The importance of bribing
23. We do not believe that a "state of tension" (individual or group tension), though
it may precede "all marked or radical changes in routine behavior criminal or non-
criminal" (STUART LoTriER, A TENSION THEORY OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, AM. Soc. REV.,
Vol. 7, No. 5, Dec. 1942, p. 846) will shed any too much light on the particular problem
of corruption and bribery, at least not in our present stage of knowledge. Tensions which
may cause any change of behavior, and neurosis too, do not contain the solution of any
particular problem. (cf. DONALD R. CRESSEY, The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust,
AM. Soc. REV., Vol. 16, No. 5, Dec. 1950, p. 738 ff).
24. SIGMUND FREUD: MASSENPSYCHOLOGIE UND ICH-ANALYSE PSYCHOANALTYISCHER Verlag,
Leipzig, 1927.
25. W. ELIASBERG: PSYCHIATRY AND PROPAGANDA J. OF NERV. AND MENT. DIs.: Vol.
101, No. 3, March 1945.
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lies in the motivation or psychological changes it touches off in both the
giver and the recipient.
For an understanding of corruption both sociological and psychologi-
cal viewpoints are necessary. Among the former the most important is
the increasing separation of the political from the economic power
and the interrelationship between oppressed, underprivileged, unas-
similable minorities, on the one hand, and on the other hand corruptible
government, officials or persons of a semi-official standing. Important
in democracy is also the specific degree of corruptibility which is, if
not quantitatively at least qualitatively, different from the specific cor-
ruptibility in other forms of government.
Psychology is called upon to explain a.) the normal non-corruptive
actions of making gifts and donations and b.) the fact why certain
character types play a part among corrupting and corruptible indi-
viduals.
Corruption is a psychologically unsatisfactory and incomplete, legally
wrongful and motivationally unethical substitute for public sympathy.
The necessity of sympathetic human relationships for the prevention
of corruption in democracy is shown.
Among th many factors that cause the multiplied feeling of inse-
curity and endangerment, corruption has come to play the most im-
portant role. Lawyers will have to cooperate with sociologists, psy-
chologists, social engineers, reformers and others in building dikes
against the flood of evil. So far this has been done by way of criminal
action. But criminal procedure, hedged as it is and should be by many
guarantees of due process of law, cannot easily follow the meanders
of corruptive practices. The general trend should be to take care of
the damages in litigation rather than in criminal action. At any rate
it would be advisable to admit action by competitors, employers, union
members and taxpayers much rriore than heretofore. Criminal sen-
tences in themselves may only very incompletely satisfy the sense of
justice and the indignation at injustices.
APPENDIx
The Kefauver investigation has brought us again a spate of well
intentioned suggestions: "Legalize gambling and there will be no
organized crime !" One might as well say: "Legalize bull fights, (giving
outlet for aggression) and we won't have any wars." Neither is
organized war "discharge" of individual aggressiveness nor organized
crime the release of the so called gambling instinct. The organizers
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of crime in connection with gambling should not be called gamblers,
but criminals.
Organized crime originates a.) from the big stakes and takes, and
b.) from the basic fact that in a democracy economic and political power
are no longer vested in the same stratum. With the big stakes there
has always been a tendency to get by way of terror, conspiracy, fraud,
buying legislatures what one cannot get in the democratic way or by
propaganda. Politicians and gangsters and the big interests have been
in an unholy alliance, not only for the exploitation of gambling. One
remembers Gustavus Meyer's book on the "History of Big Fortunes in
America," Fords vigilantes, his organization of whole communities as
his domain, buying off judges, police, county sheriffs, county councils,
and legislatures included. The latest Cleveland scandal with the presi-
dent of a big and respectable business firm hiring shady characters
to fight against unionism has just been brought out. In gambling,
business, too, there are big stakes, monopolistic tendencies, and there
is ample living room for muscle men and their organizers.
The answer, then, to our problem would not be legalization of
gambling, but nationalization, e.g., in the form of a national lottery,
which would force private interest to retire from the cultivation of
"the gambling instinct." One source of gangsterism would in this way
be dried out.
A proof of the sociological and socio-economic theory of gangsterism
can be derived from the so-called English honesty, the absence for
quite some time of organized political crime and organized crime in
connection with gambling in the 19th and 20th centuries. First one
should keep in mind that in the 18th century with the Bourys pourris
there was much rotten in the state. However, some real political
power has been left with economic leading strata up to Lloyd George
and later, and therefore there was no need to buy politicians or use
terror methods. This and no mysterious quality of the English race,
no traditional honesty, was the wall against political gangsterism and
mobster politics in England. It may be anticipated that if the leading
groups are progressively divested of political power without at the
same time losing their financial power, our typical ills will put in an
appearance in England too.
What are the lessons to be drawn from the congressional investiga-
tions? It has been American tradition to give the public the facts and
let the public take action. It certainly is important to shed light on
the local ramifications. But the illness is a generalized and systemic
one and therefore not amenable to local treatment. If here and there
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an honest sheriff, an honest district attorney, an honest mayor, an
honest police chief tries to do something, the fry just leaves the boat
and migrates into the neighboring county or state.
The legal mind has so far been sticking too much to the microscopy
of the local process, the localized illness and we have been spending
much money just on this. But autopsies, even if helped by the micro-
scope, won't achieve any too much. Some of the money should be
earmarked for the microscopic observation by those who can see
the forest in spite of the trees-i.e. for sociological and psychiatric
research to be applied to power politics.
